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COMPARATIVE FAULT AND MULTIPLE PARTY
LITIGATION IN LOUISIANA: A SAMPLING
OF THE PROBLEMS
Martha Chamallas*
Louisiana's comparative fault legislation is deceptively simple.
While only five statutory provisions were amended, the change in
the law is fundamental. The contributory negligence bar is gone,
replaced by the now widely-accepted concept of liability based on
proportionate fault. Reaching beyond the rights of the tort plaintiff,
the reform provides the framework for a comprehensive scheme of
loss apportionment in multiple party litigation. The comparative
plan restructures the contribution rights of defendants to reflect the
degree of fault of each party and formulates procedures for enlisting
the participation of the jury in the process.
As comparative fault is no longer a revolutionary idea in modern
tort law, it may seem that Act 431 is long overdue. However, reform
in this difficult area of apportioning losses arising from unintentional injury is not at all foreign to Louisiana. The last decade has
seen the courts of this state dramatically reshaping the law of torts.
By embracing the duty/risk approach and gradually extending the
reach of strict liability, the courts have been able to redistribute
losses in a more equitable fashion that accords with modern needs.
While these judicial reform efforts are still in their formative
stages, the results so far are impressive.
Since the new legislation furnishes only a general outline for
solving the problem of loss apportionment in multiple party litigation, many details will have to be worked out on a case-by-case
basis. Beyond this, the major challenge presented by the Act will be
to harmonize its basic scheme with the reforms already undertaken
by the courts.
This article presents a sampling of the kinds of problems that
are likely to arise in multiple party litigation after adoption of comparative fault in Louisiana. The Act undoubtedly will introduce new
complexities in this area of our law. Whether the legislative initiative can nevertheless enhance the prospects for equitable loss apportionment is far less certain.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The writer wishes to express appreciation for the valuable insights and assistance provided by her colleagues,
particularly Wex S. Malone, Thomas Harrell, Alston Johnson, and Saul Litvinoff.
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Basic Scheme of Act 431
In addition to dismantling the contributory negligence bar
against recovery for the negligent plaintiff, the new legislation
significantly affects the ultimate liability of defendants in a multiple
party case. Under present law, joint tortfeasors whose concurring
fault produces a single indivisible harm to the plaintiff are held
solidarily liable for the entire loss.' The Louisiana Civil Code, in
turn, provides a right of contribution to a tortfeasor who pays more
than his "virile" or pro rata share of the loss. Ultimately the judgment is divided on an equal or ratable basis, depending on the
number of tortfeasors.2
Act 431 fundamentally changes the law of contribution by applying the principle of proportionate fault to determine the division of
the loss among the tortfeasors themselves.' Although in most instances joint tortfeasors will remain solidarily liable to the plaintiff-4
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 1).
Solidary liability most commonly exists in cases in which the acts of both (or all) tortfeasors were necessary to cause the damage. See, e.g., Dixie Drive It Yourself System
New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962); Palmer
v. Turner, 252 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971). Presumably the courts would also
impose solidary liability in a case in which the act of either tortfeasor would have
caused the entire damage independently of the other. See LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
365 So. 2d 471, 477 (La. 1978) (dicta).
2. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2103 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 1).
Contribution may be secured via third party demand, Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), or by an independent plenary action, Morris v.
Kospelich, 253 La. 413, 218 So. 2d 316 (1969).
3. As amended LA. CiV. CODE art. 2103 provides in pertinent part: "If the obligation arises from an offense or a quasi-offense, it shall be divided in proportion to each
debtor's fault."
4. An exception to the rule of solidary liability of joint tortfeasors is made by
Act 431's amendment to Civil Code article 2324. A new proviso to that article declares
that
when the amount of recovery has been reduced in accordance with the preceding
article, a judgment debtor shall not be liable for more than the degree of his fault
to a judgment creditor to whom a greater degree of negligence has been attributed, reserving to all parties their respective rights of indemnity and contribution.
Thus, for example, if plaintiff's negligence is assessed at 30%/ and recovery is sought
against a defendant whose share is found to be 20%, plaintiff will be allowed to
recover only 20% of his damages from that defendant. In contrast, if the share assigned to the defendant had been 30% or greater, plaintiff could recover 70% of the
damages under the general rule of solidary liability.
This proviso is apparently designed to safeguard against the 'harsh effects of
solidary liability in cases involving an insolvent tortfeasor. See text at notes 48-61, infra. The last phrase of the article is confusing, however, since if solidary liability is
eliminated in this one special case, the defendant held liable only for his proportionate
share could have no right to contribution, although he may seek indemnity under cer-
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as among the tortfeasors, the loss no longer will be borne ratably.
Instead each tortfeasor will ultimately be held liable only for that
5
proportion of the damage attributable to his own fault.
The new comparative contribution system operates to apportion
damages on the basis of the relative fault of the defendants even in
cases in which the plaintiff is not contributorily negligent.' Thus, if a
totally innocent plaintiff is injured as a result of the combined
negligence of two defendants, the fact finder is nevertheless required to compare the degree of fault of each defendant, a finding
which will determine the amount each will ultimately bear.'
Although there is no necessary logical relationship between comparative negligence and comparative contribution,8 both operate on
the same general principle-that liability should be predicated on

tain circumstances. The article can be sensibly construed only by reading the last
phrase ("reserving to all parties their respective rights of indemnity and contribution")
as modifying the first phrase of the second paragraph of the article ("[plersons whose
concurring fault has caused injury, death or loss to another are also answerable, in
solido"). As a purely grammatical matter, this sensible construction is improper.
5. By providing for a comparison of the defendants' fault rather than negligence,
the Act operates to apportion damages on a proportionate basis even when a defendant or the defendants are held liable on a strict liability theory. Under amended article
2323, however, plaintiff will suffer a reduction of damages only if his negligence contributes to the harm, thus eliminating other types of plaintiff fault as a basis for reducing the award. The effect of Act 431 on strict liability is discussed elsewhere in this
symposium. See Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L.
REV. 403 (1980).
6. The amendment to article 2103, the basic source of the contribution right, provides generally that "[i]f the obligation arises from an offense or a quasi-offense, it
shall be divided in proportion to each debtor's fault" without reference to plaintiff's
conduct.
7. Amended Code of Civil Procedure article 1811 provides for special jury questions regarding the degree of fault of the defendant(s), LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1811(B)(1),
as well as that of any absent tortfeasor(s), LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1811(B)(2). For a discussion of the special problems of the absent tortfeasor, see text at notes 48-61, infra.
8. Many jurisdictions have embraced the principle of apportionment solely to
mitigate the harsh effects of contributory negligence and have continued to divide
losses among the tortfeasors on a ratable or equal basis, regardless of the relative
degree of fault. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (1972) (modified comparative
negligence); MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972) (pure comparative negligence); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.440 (1971) (modified comparative negligence); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-6-1
to -11 (1956) (pure comparative negligence).
Conversely, a few jurisdictions have adopted comparative contribution while at the
same time retaining the contributory negligence bar. For examples of judicial adoption
of comparative contribution, see Gomes v. Broadhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967)
(V.I.); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437,
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566
S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40

proportionate fault.9 And it is this principle that serves as the foundation for the comparative approach in both settings. Certainly in
instances in which the negligence of one tortfeasor is greatly
disproportionate to that of a co-tortfeasor, application of an
automatic equal division rule of contribution appears arbitrary." For
such cases, it is desirable to have some mechanism for comparing
the conduct of each negligent defendant, determining the relative
degree of fault, and assessing liability on a comparative basis. Indeed it would be anomalous to permit a slightly negligent plaintiff
(e.g., 10%) to recover 90% of his damages from defendants A and B,
and yet insist that A and B share the judgment equally, despite one
defendant's significantly more negligent conduct." In theory at least,
there is no logical justification for restricting the principle of comparative fault to govern apportionment only in a two-party suit.
The adoption of comparative contribution in Louisiana, however,
may not be viewed as providing the final simple solution to the problem of apportionment of damages in a multiple party suit. The approach to several subsidiary problems such as the treatment of insolvent or absent tortfeasors, 2 the effect of settlement and release, 3
and the availability of set-off, 4 will require reevaluation in light of
the new comparative scheme. Most significantly, implementation of
comparative contribution in Louisiana should proceed with a due appreciation of the important function of the judge in shaping and
fashioning the legal duties of defendants under the duty/risk
approach.

9. See Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on
Tort Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Association v.
Superior Court, 30 HAST. L.J. 1465, 1486-87 (1979); Wade, The Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 14 FORUM 379, 384-86 (1979); Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault
Act- What Should It Provide?, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REV. 220, 224-25 (1972).
10. But see Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA.
L. REV. 319, 338 (1980). Professor Johnson speculates that a rule of equal division
may be preferable in Louisiana, given the courts' power to control the result by
employing a duty/risk analysis. For a discussion of duty/risk in the multiple party case,
see text at notes 16-47, infra.
11. See, e.g., Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971); Bielski v. Schulze, 16
Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (judicial adoption of proportionate contribution
prompted by great disparity of degree of fault between tortfeasors).
12. See text at notes 48-61, infra.
13. See text at notes 62-73, infra.
14. See text at notes 74-92, infra.
15. Reference should be made to such duty/risk classics as: Green, Duties, Risks,
Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42 (1962); Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It
Yourself Versus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970); Robertson,
Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin and
Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1 (1973).
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Comparative Contribution and Duty/Risk
Simply by embracing comparative contribution in general principle, the Louisiana legislature has not determined that liability
always should depend solely on the percentage of fault assigned the
defendants by the fact finder. In many cases, the critical issue will
involve the scope of the defendant's duty, a matter largely within
the province of the trial court. Only after this duty issue has been
resolved satisfactorily does the question of the relative degrees of
fault of multiple defendants come into play. And even at this point,
the court's obligation to decide the basic scope of the duty issue
should provide justification for judicial tempering or adjustment of a
jury's verdict in some cases."
Examination of the implications of two recent Louisiana
Supreme Court decisions indicates that Louisiana's adoption of comparative negligence and contribution will not obviate the need for
careful judicial analysis of duties and risks in the particular case. In
Rue v. State Department of Highways,7 a motorist sued the state
agency for injuries sustained when she inadvertently drove her car
off the highway and struck a dangerous rut in the shoulder of the
road. The lower courts had determined that the Department of
Highways was negligent for failing to maintain the shoulder in a
safe condition but denied recovery based on the plaintiff's contributory negligence in driving her vehicle off the paved surface for
no apparent reason. 8 The supreme court reversed and held that the
plaintiff's substandard conduct should not operate to bar recovery.
Employing a duty/risk analysis, the court concluded that the defendant's duty extended to even a careless motorist such as the plaintiff
and encompassed the foreseeable risk that "for any number of
reasons, including simple inadvertence, a motorist might find
himself travelling on, or partially on, the shoulder."' 9
By fashioning the defendant's duty broadly, the court in Rue
neatly circumvented the harshness of the contributory negligence
bar. Given the greater negligence of the Department of Highways,
the court might simply have believed that it would be grossly unfair
to deny all recovery to the slightly negligent plaintiff."0 The
16. Amended Code of Civil Procedure article 1811(B), for example, directs the
court in a jury case to "enter judgment in conformity with the jury's answers to these
special questions and according to applicable law." (Emphasis added.) As discussed infra, the court's determination of the scope of defendant's duty may be regarded as a
crucial part of the "law" applicable to the case.
17. 372 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1979).
18. Id. at 1198 & nn.1-2.
19. Id. at 1199.
20. The court noted that "plaintiff's conduct if indeed it was substandard is no bar
to her recovery of damages occasioned chiefly because the Highway Department
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duty/risk approach may thus have functioned as a convenient device
seized upon by the court to justify the more desirable result: 100%
relief rather than no recovery at all. If this is a correct assessment
of Rue, we can speculate that after adoption of comparative
negligence, the court in a similar action should have little difficulty
deciding that the plaintiff's negligence warrants a reduction of
damages.
It is far from clear, however, that passage of the comparative
fault statute should change the result in Rue (i.e., 100% recovery
for the plaintiff). As Professor Johnson thoughtfully analyzes in this
symposium,"' a strong argument can be made that in defining
defendant's duty to encompass the risk of the careless plaintiff, the
court in Rue was doing more than employing a fiction to overcome
the contributory negligence bar. Policy considerations underlying
the decision may have required that even the careless plaintiff be
allowed full recovery.22 The negligence of the Department of
Highways posed a risk of serious injury to a great number of persons who may encounter the hazardous condition. The plaintiff's inadvertence, on the other hand, presented only a relatively slight
risk of harm to herself and to passengers in the meandering vehicle.
This lack of mutuality of risks may prompt the court to decide that
policy dictates that, in some cases at least, plaintiff's carelessness
should not even operate to reduce the award.23 The Department is in
the best position to decrease the chances of any future injury by
repairing the road. The court could reasonably conclude that only
full recovery would produce the desired prophylactic effect, especially if reduction of plaintiff's damages would not serve to deter other
motorists from inadvertent meandering but would function solely as
a penalty for substandard conduct.
The interaction of duty/risk and comparative fault produces
even more complexities in a multiple party case. Suppose that the
plaintiff in Rue had driven onto the shoulder to avoid an oncoming
vehicle driven by X who was encroaching slightly over the center
line. It could fairly be determined that X was negligent in crossing
the center line at all but that plaintiff also negligently overreacted
negligently failed to maintain a safe highway shoulder." Id. (Emphasis added.)
21. See generally Johnson, supra note 10, at 333-34.
22. For a comprehensive discussion of Louisiana's selective abrogation of the contributory negligence bar, see the excellent student note, Abrogation of the Contributory Negligence Bar in Cases of DisparateRisks, 39 LA. L. REV. 637 (1979).
23. Article 2323 as amended authorizes a reduction of damages only "[wihen contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages." Elsewhere in this symposium, Professor Johnson demonstrates that the statutory limitation is most compatible with the duty/risk approach and may well prohibit any reduction of damages in certain cases when defendant's duty extends to the protection of a careless plaintiff.
Johnson, supra note 10, at 333-34.
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by driving onto the shoulder rather than merely swerving slightly
to the right.
Rue suggests that under present law, at least, plaintiff nevertheless may receive full recovery against the Department of
Highways.24 The risk that a motorist will negligently respond to an
apparent emergency is highly foreseeable and seems to fit comfortably within the duty of the Department to protect certain careless
plaintiffs in certain circumstances.25
If the Department paid the total judgment, however, it is
unclear whether under the present contributory negligence scheme
it could obtain contribution from X, even though Xs negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. X could argue that he should not
be considered a joint tortfeasor liable in solido with the Department,
since the flexible duty/risk approach allows for the possibility that
the plaintiff's careless conduct will be considered an included risk
when gauged against the duty of one defendant but may defeat
liability in relation to another defendant.
Generally, a tortfeasor has a right to obtain contribution only if
he proves that the injured party would have been entitled to
recover against the defendant in the contribution action." In this
hypothetical case, X might well have prevailed in an action brought
by the plaintiff, relying on plaintiff's contributory negligence to bar
recovery.
Vis-i-vis the oncoming driver, plaintiff's position is not as strong
as that presented in the case against the Highway Department. The
conduct of each driver created a similar risk of injury to travelers
on the highway. Moreover, imposing liability on X is unlikely to
function as a strong deterrent, and there is no reason to believe that
X rather than the plaintiff is better able to bear and distribute the
loss. In light of these factors, it is doubtful that the court would be
willing to lift the contributory negligence bar by declaring that Xs
duty not to traverse the center line was designed to protect even
negligent motorists in the "obstructed" lane. Thus, to succeed in the
contribution action, the Department must either convince the court
that plaintiff's contributory negligence would not have proved fatal
in an action brought against X or that X may not fairly raise the
24. Cf. Watson v. Morrison, 340 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
342 So. 2d 218 (La. 1977) (full recovery granted where motorist drove off paved surface
mistakenly responding to apparent emergency).
25. Conversely, the Department's duty does not extend to all negligent plaintiffs
in all circumstances. See Rodgers v. State Dep't of Hwys., No. 13,936 (La. App. 2d Cir.
Sept. 24, 1979) (post-Rue case denying recovery where intoxicated driver was aware of
dangerous road shoulder).
26. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 309 (4th ed. 1971).
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contributory negligence argument in the contribution action.27 These
obstacles make it likely that the Department would be responsible
for paying the entire judgment.
Once comparative negligence and comparative contribution are
in force, the possible solutions to the Rue-type three-party case
multiply. Assume that under the new comparative regime, plaintiff
in the hypothetical case files suit against both the Highway Department and X and the defendants request a jury trial.28 If the judge
concludes that there is evidence to raise a jury issue with respect to
the negligence of all three parties, a cursory reading of amended
Code of Civil Procedure article 1811 might suggest that the court
must now submit the case to the jury via special written questions.
The jury would then be told to decide whether each party's conduct constituted a "proximate cause" of the damages,29 determine the "degree
of fault" of each "expressed in percentage," and assess the total amount
of damages sustained by the plaintiff. Finally, based on the percentage
figures returned by the jury, the court would determine the liability
of each defendant simply by multiplying his assigned percentage
times the total amount of damages.
The amendment providing for special verdicts in damage actions need not be interpreted to require the court's stringent
adherence to the above scenario in all cases. Rather, even after
passage of the comparative fault legislation, the court should retain
27. An analogy could be drawn to cases in which the court has refused to permit
the defendant in the contribution action to defeat recovery by relying solely on his
personal immunity to suit in an action by the injured party. See Walker v. Milton, 263
La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972) (joint tortfeasor may recover contribution from plaintiffs
parent); Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122
(1965) (joint tortfeasor may recover contribution from plaintiffs husband). These cases
dealt with a procedural bar to recovery and would likely prove unpersuasive when the
obstacle to liability is a substantive defense such as contributory negligence. Cf Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. United States, 511 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1975).
28. The hypothetical case would likely be tried to the court sitting without a jury
since Revised Statutes 13:5105 bars jury trials in suits against the state agency.
However, the statutory prohibition has been held not to deprive a public body of the
opportunity for a jury trial if it so desires. Triche v. City of Houma, 342 So. 2d 1155
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
29. It is unfortunate that the Act speaks in terms of "proximate cause," a confusing label that is rapidly being discarded in the adjudication of tort cases in Louisiana.
See generally Robertson, supra note 15. By directing the court to submit a jury question "inquiring as to" proximate cause, the legislature may simply have intended to
focus the jury's attention on the basic cause-in-fact issue. If so, article 1811 should be
amended to delete the word "proximate" to avoid confusion. However, if it is deemed
desirable to have the jury participate in determining the scope or ambit of a party's
duty, a suitable instruction can be fashioned without reference to proximate causation.
See A. JOHNSON, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN LOUISIANA CIVIL CASES WITH ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS 1-19 (1980) (thorough analysis of several possible formulations of
jury instructions relating to-'the problem of risk exclusion).
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its power to control the result, both with respect to the existence of
liability as well as the extent of liability. Such control can be exerted by permitting the court to conform the jury's verdict to its
own assessment of the scope of defendants' duties in the particular
30
case.
In theory, the new comparative legislation authorizes at least
four different solutions to loss apportionment in the Rue-type multiple party case. In each, the court's evaluation of the scope of defendants' duty plays a critical role in determining the extent of liability.
First, the court could decide that the broad duty of the Highway
Department to protect even careless motorists provides justification
for some recovery, but should not deprive the agency of its comparative negligence "defense." Unconstrained by the all or nothing
choice presented under the prior law, the Department may now
more forcefully insist that plaintiff's substandard conduct warrants
a penalty in the form of a reduction of damages commensurate with
the plaintiff's proportionate fault. The court could thus reassess the
rationale of Rue and conclude that the policy reasons for holding the
Department liable for 100% of the plaintiff's damages in that case
do not compel similar treatment now that the option of a limited
recovery is available.
As between the two defendants, the new comparative
negligence scheme may furnish the Department with a solid basis
for obtaining contribution from X, the oncoming driver. No longer
would X be able to claim that plaintiff's contributory negligence
operates as a bar to recovery in an action by the plaintiff against
him. Rather it is most likely that under pure comparative negligence
the plaintiff could obtain a reduced judgment against X as well as
the Department.' Under this analysis, the Department should have
a right to compel contribution from the oncoming driver on a comparative basis and should be responsible only for its own proportionate share. In a jury case, the court would submit the issue of the
negligence of all parties and render judgment based on the percentage figures returned by the jury. Plaintiff would receive a reduced
judgment and both the Department and X would satisfy the reduced
judgment proportionately.
Second, as mentioned above, 2 the court might well regard the
Department's broad duty as rendering the plaintiff's contributory
30. The statutory basis for sanctioning such leeway in the computation of the final
judgment is article 1811's direction that the court enter judgment "according to applicable law." See note 16, supra.
31. But see text at note 33, infra, setting forth a possible argument for X to
defeat recovery.
32. See text at notes 21-25, supr. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 333-34.
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negligence "inapplicable" or irrelevant and thus furnishing no
justification for even a reduction of damages. This determination
would manifest the court's affirmation of the policy underlying Rue,
thus requiring that this negligent plaintiff be fully compensated, notwithstanding the legislative judgment that other negligent plaintiffs
should suffer a reduction of damages.
Moreover, it is conceivable that the Department's right to seek
contribution from X might also be affected by the court's duty
determination. Particularly if the court were to focus on the disparity of the risks created by the two tortfeasors, it might conclude
that the entire loss should be shifted to the Department. Once the
Department's duty is enlarged to encompass a risk posed in part by
negligent driving, there may be a temptation to correspondingly
limit the scope of the motorist's duty solely to the risk of injuries
sustained on safely maintained roadways.
By taking such an extreme view, the court would absolve X
from all responsibility-both to pay the plaintiff initially as well as
to respond to the Department's contribution claim." Such a broad
judicial view of the Department's duty would limit the role of the
jury severely; only the questions of the negligence of the Department and the extent of plaintiff's damages would be submissible. As
under present law, plaintiff would recover 100% of the damages
solely from the Department.
Third, the court could decide that although plaintiff should not
suffer any reduction of damages, given the Department's comprehensive duty, the Department should nevertheless be entitled to
obtain contribution from the oncoming driver as a joint tortfeasor.
The question then arises as to the proper basis for dividing the
damages between the two tortfeasors. Should the judge instruct the
jury to ignore plaintiff's negligent contribution to the injury and
assign percentages as if only two persons negligently produced the
harm?34 If the plaintiff's conduct is disregarded, X could argue that
he has been prejudiced insofar as he has been required to propor33. Most probably, the Department's contribution right against X would be
recognized if X were deemed to be liable in any degree to the plaintiff. In Louisiana,
the courts have been particularly reluctant to afford a joint tortfeasor a tort indemnity
right against his co-defendant, unless the former is completely free from personal fault.
See, e.g., Green v. Taca Int'l Airlines, 304 So. 2d 357 (La. 1974); Lee v. City of Baton
Rouge, 243 La. 850, 147 So. 2d 868 (1962); Second Church of Christ, Scientist v..
Spencer, 230 La. 432, 88 So. 2d 810 (1956). In the hypothetical case, X would have little
basis for arguing that the entire loss should be borne by the Department once it is
determined that X was negligent and legally responsible to the plaintiff.
34. A similar problem of comparison exists when one of the tortfeasors is absent
or insolvent. See text at notes 48-61, infra.
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tionately bear the plaintiff's share. 5 A more desirable approach
might be to tack the plaintiff's share onto the share of the Department. In a jury case, the court might adjust or temper the verdict in
accordance with the law (i.e., the court's duty determination) by
taking the plaintiff's percentage of negligence and adding it to the
Department's share." Plaintiff would then recover 100%, X would
be held liable for his proportionate share, and the Department
would pay for its own negligence and that of the plaintiff.
Fourth, the court might seek to effectuate its broad duty determination by allowing plaintiff to recover both his share and the
share of the Department from the Department alone. At the same
time, the principle of comparative negligence could be given effect
by curtailing plaintiff's right to recover the balance of his damages
from the oncoming motorist. Such a compromise approach could be
implemented either by a deduction in an amount representing the
percentage of plaintiff's negligence times the outstanding balance or
by a deduction based on the ratio of plaintiff's negligence to that of
X." Again, the court would exercise control over the ultimate apportionment by conforming the jury's percentages to its own determination of the parties' respective duties. Plaintiff would receive less
than 1000/0 recovery, with the oncoming motorist deriving all the
benefit from the reduction.
These four solutions, and perhaps others, suggest possible interpretations of the new statute when juxtaposed with the duty/risk
approach. The first choice, that of holding each negligent party
responsible for his proportionate share, seems preferable under the
limited facts of the hypothetical case. The equities do not lie so
heavily in favor of plaintiff such that any reduction in damages is
unwarranted. Moreover, there does not appear to be an overriding
policy justification for charging the Department with the entire loss,
although it is likely that it will end up paying the bulk of the
damages.3 8 That the full-scale comparative solution may be most
35. For example, assume the plaintiff's damages are $100,000 and that the plaintiff
is 10% negligent; X, 30% negligent; and the Department, 60% negligent. If the plaintiffs contribution is disregarded, the share of X would be increased to $33,333, representing the ratio of Xs negligence to that of the Department.
36. Thus using the percentages given in note 35, supra, X would pay $30,000 and
the Department $70,000.
37. Thus, for example, the court could conform its judgment to the jury's percentages as given in note 35, supra, by requiring the Department to pay $70,000 and
limiting X's obligation to either $27,000 or $20,000, depending on the method used to
arrive at the appropriate deduction.
38. A problem might arise if the verdict indicates that the jury placed too little
weight on the Department's "passive" negligence in failing to maintain a safe shoulder
and too much weight on the other participants' "active" negligence. In such a case, it
might be desirable to permit the judge to refuse to adhere to the jury's percentages
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desirable in this litigation, however, provides little help in a factually and legally dissimilar action.
The recent case of Boyer v. Johnson9 provides a striking contrast. A fifteen-year-old boy was killed when he lost control of a
commercial vehicle he had been employed to drive, skidded along
the shoulder of the road into a ditch, and struck a tree. In a
wrongful death action brought against an executive officer of the
boy's employer," the supreme court granted full recovery. The court
based its decision on the defendant's violation of certain statutory
provisions prohibiting the employment of minors to drive commercial vehicles or work in connection with power driven machinery.4 '
Although the boy had been negligent in his operation of the vehicle,
the court held that such negligence did not preclude recovery since
the key purpose of the child labor statutes was to protect the minor
against risks arising from his own negligence, youth, and inexperience.42 Again, by fashioning the defendant's duty broadly, the
court was able to circumvent the contributory negligence bar and
clear the way for 100% recovery for the plaintiffs.
If Boyer is transformed into a three-party suit, sticky problems
arise in the determination of the proper allocation of damages under
the new comparative statute. Assume that the fifteen-year-old boy,
while driving the commercial vehicle, was killed when he collided
with a car driven by A. The evidence discloses that A was negligent
in stopping his car so as to create a partial obstruction in the lane of
and instead substitute his own evaluation as to the degree of fault of each of the parties. Absent the sanction of a procedural device such as a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, however, it is doubtful that the judge's power extends this far. For a
discussion of the procedural devices available to allocate tasks between the judge and
jury, see A. JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 4-11.
39. 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978).
40. The suit arose prior to the 1976 amendments to Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Act that now bars an employee from suing his co-employee in tort for workrelated injuries. See 1976 La. Acts, No. 147, amending LA. R.S. 23:1032 & 1101 (1950).
Thus it is doubtful that a similar action could be maintained today, unless the bar
against co-employee suits is held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Grantham v. Denke, 359
So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978); Halenar v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 27, 504 P.2d 928 (1972) (barring suit against negligent co-employee held violative of state constitution). in the
following discussion of Boyer, the term "employer" is used for convenience to
designate an executive officer of the plaintiff's employer. There is no question that a
suit against the actual employer would be barred because of the exclusive workmen's
compensation remedy.
41. LA. R.S. 23:161(10) (Supp. 1976); 23:163 (1950). The statutes make it unlawful for
a minor to "be employed, permitted or suffered to work" in certain dangerous occupations. LA. R.S. 23:163 (1950). Presumably an executive officer (as well as the technical
employer) falls within the statutory prohibition by "permitting" a minor employee to
work in such circumstances.
42. 360 So. 2d at 1169.
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traffic, but that the boy was also negligent in failing to keep a
proper lookout and safely maneuver his vehicle around the obstruction.
In a wrongful death action brought against both A and the
employer by the boy's parents, the court at the outset must grapple
with difficult scope of duty questions. Relying on Boyer, the court
may regard the employer's duty as encompassing the risk that the
minor would be injured as a result of his own negligence in combination with that of another driver." Should the minor's negligence
nevertheless provide a justification for reduction of damages in the
suit against the employer? Even after passage of the comparative
negligence statute, a strong argument can be made that reduction is
unwarranted since the policy against the employment of minors is a
particularly strong one. 4 The employer may more easily bear and
distribute the risk as a cost of doing business and is in a better position to prevent recurrence of similar injuries by obeying the
legislative proscription against hiring minors. These considerations
may well counsel in favor of 100% recovery in an action against the
employer.
The same policy considerations are not present in the suit
against A. When the negligent conduct of the deceased is viewed in
relation to the negligent conduct of A, there is a stronger argument
for a reduction of damages. Both drivers created a similar risk of injury to themselves and others, and no strong general policy exists to
protect minors as operators of motor vehicles. Moreover, there is
no reason to believe that A rather than the plaintiffs is necessarily
better able to shoulder and distribute the loss.
In this factual setting, the third approach suggested above in the
Rue-based hypothetical case may be preferable. Given the special
statutory protection afforded minors, it seems just to require the
employer to pay for the minor's proportionate share as well as his
own, while requiring A to pay only in proportion to his individual
fault.
43. C.f., e.g., Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1970); Dixie
Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137
So. 2d 298 (1962) (statutory duty not to obstruct highway encompassed risk of intervening negligence of third-party motorist).
44. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 23:161 (Supp. 1976) (fourteen prohibited occupations for
minors). To promote the policy behind the child labor laws, most contributory
negligence jurisdictions have allowed recovery despite the minor employee's
negligence. See, e.g., Boyles v. Hamilton, 235 Cal. App. 2d 492, 45 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1965);
Dusha v. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482 (1920); Karpeles v.
Heine, 227 N.Y. 74, 124 N.E. 101 (1919). One court has even refused to permit the
minor's negligence to operate to reduce the award in a comparative negligence setting.
Hartwell Handle Co. v. Jack, 149 Miss. 465, 115 So. 586 (1928).
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On the other hand, requiring the employer to pay 100% of the
damages would surely bolster the legislative determination that
employing minors to perform tasks beyond their competence is
highly undesirable. More importantly, administrative considerations
favor shifting the entire loss to the employer. To require the judge
or particularly a jury to evaluate the degree of fault attributable to
the employer and in turn compare that to the negligent conduct of A
is fraught with difficulty. The employer is held strictly liable for
violating the statutory prohibition, even though he may have acted
as a totally reasonable employer in supervising and instructing his
minor employee. In marked contrast, the basis for holding A liable is
personal fault; if A had acted as a reasonable driver he could have
escaped liability altogether. In determining the share of the
employer, should the fact finder take into account the employer's effort at supervision and instruction, thereby reintroducing personal
fault to determine the extent of liability if not its existence? Unless
the employer's conduct is measured using a negligence yardstick, it
seems impossible to 45
compare it in a meaningful fashion to the conduct of the motorist.
A reintroduction of personal fault in the child labor case could
undercut the legislative (and judicial) decision to hold the employer
strictly accountable. Despite the seeming inconsistency with the
comparative fault principle, placing the entire burden on the
employer may be the most practical and equitable solution.46
Many more examples could be given to demonstrate that the
goal of equitable loss apportionment will not be accomplished simply
by empowering the judge or jury to divide the damages based on
the parties' proportionate fault.47 The determination of the amount
each party should pay cannot and should not be divorced from the
considerations of policy that have influenced the courts to expand or
45. For a discussion of the problem of "comparing the incomparables," see Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167
(1978); Fleming, supra note 9, at 1472-77; Plant, supra note 9.
46. Another feasible alternative to placing the loss on the employer alone, given
the problems of comparison, would be to divide the damages on a per capita basis and
require each tortfeasor to pay 50%. For a discussion of the advantages of a pro rata or
discount system in strict liability settings, see Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
3d 725, 749-51, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 393-95, 575 P.2d 1162, 1175-77 (1978) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
47. E.g., suppose a pedestrian, after being ejected from a bar in an intoxicated
condition, is run over by a negligent motorist. Two recent supreme court decisions,
Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978); Pence v. Ketchum,
326 So. 2d 831 (La. 1976), may be interpreted to allow the plaintiff full recovery,
despite the existence of contributory negligence. Apportioning the damages between
the bar owner and the motorist would present problems similar to those posed in the
hypothetical cases discussed in the text.
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restrict the scope of the risks for which defendants will be held
liable. Rather, by embracing the principle of proportionate fault, the
legislature has potentially given the courts a powerful new tool to
distribute losses from unintentional injury on other than a crude all
or nothing basis. The presumed benefits of the new legislation could
be largely undermined, however, if a mechanical application of comparative fault serves to stifle or suffocate the development of the
duty/risk analysis in Louisiana.
Solidary Liability and the Absent or Insolvent Tortfeasor
The goal of equitable loss apportionment in a multiple party
case cannot be fully achieved without consideration of the closely
related issues of solidary liability and the treatment of absent or insolvent tortfeasors. The new legislation only partially addresses
these problems and raises several questions for future litigation.
With one notable exception, Act 431 reaffirms the principle of
solidary liability of joint tortfeasors.48 As under present law, a defendant whose conduct contributed to plaintiff's injury may be
obligated to pay the plaintiff for his own share as well as that attributable to the conduct of other tortfeasors.49
Although at first glance solidary liability appears to conflict
with the principle of proportionate fault and may seem unfair to the
defendant, the doctrine rarely entails hardship for the solidary
obligor. Rather, in the vast majority of cases the tortfeasor ultimately can reduce his burden by seeking contribution from his
co-tortfeasor via a third-party demand or an independent action." It
is only when such co-tortfeasor is not amenable to suit in the
jurisdiction, cannot be found, or is insolvent that the doctrine is of
practical significance.
The modern justification for the retention of solidary liability is
founded on the notion that the innocent plaintiff should obtain full
compensation from any person whose fault was an indispensable factor in producing the harm.51 As a matter of fairness, the party at
48. The amendment to article 2324 explicitly states that "[plersons whose concurring fault has caused injury, death or loss to another are also answerable, in solido."
The proviso to article 2324 creating an exception to the rule of solidary liability is
discussed in note 4, supra.
49. Of course, under pure comparative fault, the solidary obligor will not be required to pay for the portion of the loss attributable to plaintiff's contributory
negligence. Instead, any disproportionate liability will arise solely from payment of a
co-tortfeasor's share.
50. See note 2, supra.
51. See, e.g., Thorton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 542, 552, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 (1962);
Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties, and Settlements, 65 CAL. L.
REV. 1264, 1265-66 (1977).
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fault should have the burden of bringing all others responsible for
the harm into the lawsuit. When all tortfeasors cannot be joined, it
is just to require the blameworthy defendant to pursue his contribution claim in another forum or suffer any loss arising from the uncollectible nature of the debt.
Adoption of comparative fault legislation does not of itself affect
the soundness of the above analysis. If the plaintiff is in no way contributory negligent, he should still be entitled to the procedural and
substantive benefits of the rule of solidary liability. Thus, most
jurisdictions regard the abolition of solidary liability as unduly
harsh in the case of the totally innocent plaintiff.2
It is much harder to justify application of solidary liability when
the plaintiff's substandard conduct contributes in part to his own injuries. In such circumstances, there is no logical reason why the
defendant should always bear the burden of pursuing absent defendants and absorbing all losses from insolvency. Influenced by the
likelihood that a negligent plaintiff will be unfairly benefited, some
jurisdictions have abolished solidary liability along with the adoption of comparative negligence. 3
Following the approach of the Texas comparative negligence
legislation, 4 Act 431 adopts a compromise position with respect to
solidary liability. Amended article 2324 retains solidary liability in
those cases in which the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or less
than the defendant's but eliminates solidary liability when the plaintiff's degree of negligence is greater than the defendant's degree of
fault.55
This partial abrogation of solidary liability effects a kind of
rough justice, not unlike the compromise struck by modified comparative negligence plans. When the tortfeasor's absence is caused
by jurisdictional hurdles only, the legislative compromise is acceptable. However, the scheme is likely to produce particularly harsh
results to plaintiffs and defendants alike when the absent
tortfeasor's share is truly uncollectible.
Effective implementation of a pure comparative fault scheme
such as that adopted by Louisiana requires that all persons respon52. See, e.g., Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc. v. Edrington, 259 Ark. 600, 535 S.W.2d 225
(1976); Dunham v. Kampman, 37 Colo. App. 233, 547 P.2d 263 (1975), aff'd, 560 P.2d 91
(Colo. 1977); Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975); Fitzgerald v. Badger State
Mut. Cas. Co., 67 Wis. 2d 321, 227 N.W.2d 444 (1975).
53. See, e.g., Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978) (joint and several
liability abolished whenever plaintiff's fault is "at issue"); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3)
(1973) (joint tortfeasor liable only for proportionate share).
54. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon 1973). See also OR. REV. STAT. §
18-485 (1975).
55. See proviso to amended article 2324, cited at note 4, supra.
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sible for the injury be brought into the litigation. If a tortfeasor is
absent, problems may arise in assigning the correct percentage of
fault to the existing parties to the litigation. Moreover, since the absent tortfeasor is not bound by the determinations made in a suit in
which he was not a party, there is always the risk that an inconsistent judgment will be rendered in a subsequent action.
Louisiana's liberal joinder rules"6 and the availability of the third
party demand"7 generally make it feasible for either the plaintiff or
the existing defendant to bring in other involved parties in a tort action. Often the plaintiff can be expected to sue all possible defendants, especially if his claim is vulnerable with regard to any particular party. If for some reason the plaintiff chooses not to sue a
particular tortfeasor, the existing defendant ordinarily can be relied
upon to bring him in as a third party defendant either to direct attention away from the defendant's alleged wrongdoing or to secure
contribution in the most speedy manner.
When joinder of all involved persons is not feasible, two interrelated problems arise. First, how should the fault of the absent tortfeasor be taken into account in computing the shares of the existing
parties? Second, who should bear the burden, even provisionally,
that may result from the tortfeasor's absence?
The new legislation contemplates that the conduct of all persons
responsible for plaintiff's injury should be evaluated by the fact
finder. Under amended Code of Civil Procedure article 1811, the
judge is required to submit a special question to the jury regarding
the causative fault of "another involved person" who was not made
a party to the suit. In turn, the judge is responsible for computing
the amounts owed by the existing defendant(s) "in conformity with
the jury's answers." But article 1811 fails to specify how the absent
tortfeasor's share should affect the amount recoverable by the plaintiff. The article does not state whether, in computing the judgment,
the court must base its calculations strictly on the assigned percentages or rather should compare the defendant's fault to that of the
plaintiff only, by using the jury's answers to construct a ratio of
fault between the parties to the lawsuit.
Suppose plaintiff (P) sustains injuries amounting to $100,000 as a
result of his own negligence and that of two other persons (A and B).
P chooses to sue A alone and A does not assert a third party demand against B. In response to the special interrogatories, the jury
assigns percentages of fault as follows: P, 20%; A, 30%; B, 50%.
56.
57.

LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 463-65 & 647.

LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1031.
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At first blush, article 1811 seems to suggest that P is entitled to
judgment against A for $80,000-the amount of his loss reduced by
the share represented by his contributory negligence (ie., 20% or
$20,000). However, the language is susceptible of another interpretation: the court should conform its judgment to the jury's answers by
considering the ratio of A's negligence to that of the plaintiff. When
viewed in this light, A should bear only 60% of the loss ($60,000),
since the ratio of fault between P and A is two to three or 40% and
60%. Under this analysis, plaintiff's recovery will have been reduced
proportionately vis-i-vis the only other party in the suit, namely A.
The practical effect of employing the ratio approach is to divide
the absent tortfeasor's share between the existing parties on a
proportionate basis. The primary advantage of this method of computing shares is that neither party will be required to shoulder the
loss unilaterally but will pay for the absent tortfeasor's share only
in proportion to his own fault. 8
Although the new Act is ambiguous on this score, it is doubtful
that the legislature intended to endorse the ratio approach. Instead,
amended Civil Code article 2324 suggests that the absent
tortfeasor's share should be borne solely by the party who is more
at fault. The thrust of the amended article is that the more
blameworthy party should pursue the absent tortfesor in another
forum or absorb the loss if such person proves to be insolvent or
cannot be located.
When the sole reason for the tortfeasor's absence is that he is
not amenable to suit in the forum, the legislative compromise seems
acceptable. The party more at fault need only provisionally pay for
the absent tortfeasor's share. Presumably he can cut his losses down
to his proportionate share simply by filing another lawsuit. The
burden of pursuit, although entailing additional expense, may
reasonably be placed on the party judged chiefly responsible for the
damage.
If the absent tortfeasor is insolvent or if for any other reason
his share is uncollectible, the compromise approach of article 2324
can be quite harsh to either the plaintiff or the solvent defendant."
58. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act in effect adopts the ratio approach by
limiting the comparison of fault to "parties" and ignoring the contribution of persons

who are not before the court. See

UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT

§ 2(a)(2) & com-

ment. For the text of the Uniform Act, see the appendix to this symposium, infra p.
419.
59. Of course, the same result would obtain even if the insolvent tortfeasor were
brought into the suit. The real risk derives from the uncollectible nature of a portion
of the debt, not from absence. However, since no advantage can be gained under Act
431 from suing a judgment-proof person, it is likely that litigants will simply not join
such persons.
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The dramatic example would be a case in which plaintiff is found to
be 20% negligent; tortfeasor A, 19% negligent; and tortfeasor B,
61% negligent. A sole percentage point determines whether plaintiff
will recover a substantial judgment (i.e., 80%) from A in case of B's insolvency or whether his recovery will be limited to a mere 19% of
his damages. The plan of article 2324 suffers from the arbitrary
feature associated with modified comparative negligence statutes in
that a plaintiff's ultimate recovery may be unduly affected by the
precise percentage of fault assigned by the fact finder. Nor does it
seem to accord with the basic principle of proportionate loss allocation to require the solvent defendant to shoulder the full insolvency
loss when the plaintiff is also at fault, albeit to a lesser degree.
Aside from these equitable considerations, the compromise embodied in amended article 2324 tends to conflict with other pronouncements of the Civil Code. Article 2104 sets down the general
rule that a solidary codebtor who pays the whole debt may assert a
claim for only the "part and portion" attributable to his codebtor.
The article additionally provides for the case of the insolvent codebtor
and declares that "the loss occasioned by his [i.e., a codebtor's] insolvency must be equally shared amongst all the other solvent codebtors and him who has made the payment."
By distributing the loss among the solvent solidary obligors, article 2104 seems to endorse an equitable principle that all responsible persons should bear the insolvency burden. In contrast, amended article 2324 contemplates that the burden of insolvency shall fall
solely on the party more at fault, whether plaintiff or defendant.
It is unclear whether article 2104 will have any application to
tort cases once the comparative fault statute goes into effect.
Although the courts have indicated that the codal rules governing
solidary liability apply both to conventional and delictual obligations," article 2104 contains two features that may be incompatible
with the new comparative scheme.
First, the provision refers to the payment of the "whole debt"
by the solidary obligor. In cases in which plaintiff's recovery has
been reduced because of contributory negligence, even the more at
fault solidary tortfeasor will no longer be liable for the "whole
debt," unless that phrase is construed to mean the balance owed by
the tortfeasors. It is thus arguable that article 2104 will be limited
solely to cases involving innocent plaintiffs. Second, the article
states that the insolvency loss shall be shared "equally" among
the solvent codebtors. Such equal sharing, at least in basic principle,
60. E.g., Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915, 920 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
Accord, Cunningham v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 228 So. 2d 700, 707 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1969).
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is at odds with the proportionate division of the debt mandated by
the amendment to article 2103.
If these apparent inconsistencies are held not to prevent application of article 2104 in the tort context, we can expect anomalous
results. Thus assume that plaintiff suffers damage from his own
negligence and that of the three defendants (A, B, C), and that B is
insolvent. The court or jury determines the percentages of fault as
follows: P, 25%; A, 30%; B, 30%; C, 15%. In P's suit against A and
C, P will be entitled to recover 75% of his damages from A alone
under the provisions of amended article 2324. A in turn has a right
to collect contribution from C and might rely on article 2104 to
argue that C should pay more than his 15% share to make up for
B's insolvency.
In a very similar case, however, it is doubtful that plaintiff
would have the same opportunity to require disproportionate contribution from a solvent tortfeasor. Thus, assume the percentages
are changed slightly as follows: P, 30%; A, 25%; B, 250; C, 20%.
Under article 2324, neither A nor C would be held solidarily liable
but instead each would be required only to pay for his own proportionate share. It is unlikely that P could enlist the aid of article 2104
to support the claim that A and C should share in the insolvency
loss. Only by extending the language of article 2104 so as to include
plaintiff as a solidary obligor who has "made the payment" could
plaintiff prevail.
It is difficult to harmonize the either/or compromise of article
2324 with the sharing approach of article 2104. To prevent confusion, the legislature should provide a clear rule for treatment of the
problem of the insolvent tortfeasor and other uncollectible losses.
The most equitable solution would be to create a mechanism for
redistributing uncollectible shares on a proportionate basis. 1
However, this approach is admittedly complex and may prolong
litigation. If simplicity is desired, article 2324 could be further
amended to provide that the party more at fault shall bear any loss
resulting from the uncollectible nature of a portion of the debt.
Settlement and Release
Although the effect of settlement and release of a joint tortfeasor is not explicitly dealt with in the new legislation, Louisiana
caselaw furnishes adequate general guidelines for the court to follow
61. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(d); Pearson, Apportionment of
Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L.
REV. 343, 364-65 (1980); Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the
United States and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV. 299, 310-11 (1980).
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under a comparative system. Settlement with one of several joint
tortfeasors raises two principal issues: the finality of the settlement
with respect to the nonsettling tortfeasors and the effect of the settlement on the amount plaintiff can recover from these tortfeasors 2
The Civil Code has be6n construed to allow the plaintiff to settle
with and release one of several tortfeasors while reserving his right
of action against the remaining tortfeasors."3 The settlement is
regarded as final not only between the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor; it has also operated to preclude the nonsettling tortfeasor(s)
from subsequently claiming contribution from the released person."4
As a corollary to this finality rule, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover only a diminished judgment from the nonsettling tortfeasors, reduced by the part or share of the settling tortfeasor."
This pro rata approach has the effect of placing on the plaintiff
(rather than the nonsettling tortfeasors) the risk of any undervaluation of the settlement. Thus if plaintiff settles for what is later
determined to be less than the settling tortfeasor's share, he may
not recoup his "loss" from any tortfeasor. Correspondingly, plaintiff
is allowed to keep the benefit of any overvaluation resulting from
the settling tortfeasor's payment of more than his pro rata share."
Louisiana's pro rata approach may easily be modified to conform
to the comparative scheme. Rather than reducing the judgment on a
62. For comprehensive discussions of the options with respect to the problem of
the settling tortfeasor, see Fleming, supra note 9, at 1494-98; Comment, supra note 51,
at 1275-82.
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2203 provides:
The remission or conventional discharge in favor of one of the codebtors in
solido, discharges all the others, unless the creditor has expressly reserved his
right against the latter.
In the latter case, he cannot claim the debt without making a deduction of the
part of him to whom he has made remission.
The courts have applied article 2203 in the tort context. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Strain,
341 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 343 So. 2d 1072 (La. 1977); Clay v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 330 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Berger v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
64. Morris v. Kospelich, 253 La. 413, 218 So. 2d 316 (1969); Cunningham v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 228 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Harvey v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
65. See cases cited at note 64, supra.
66. Many states follow a pro tanto (rather than pro rata) rule with respect to
settlement. Under this approach good faith settlements generally are regarded as final
both as to the plaintiff and nonsettling tortfeasors, but the judgment against the remaining tortfeasors is reduced by the amount actually paid by the settling tortfeasor.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1957); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(5) (West
1976); NEv. REV. STAT. § 17.245 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04 (1957); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 23-3105 (1968). The pro tanto approach is plaintiff-oriented in that it places any
loss due to undervaluation on the nonsettling tortfeasors.
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per capita basis, the plaintiff's recovery against the remaining tortfeasors would be reduced by the proportionate share of the settling
tortfeasor.6 7 As amended, article 1811 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides a sufficient method for achieving this result since the fact
finder may assign a percentage of fault to every person involved in
the accident, presumably including those persons who have been
released by the plaintiff.
Once the concept of comparative contribution is accepted, of
course, the considerations underlying the settlement process become
more complex. As under present law, the parties to settlement
negotiations must predict how many persons ultimately will be held
liable for plaintiff's injury (ie., the number of tortfeasors) and the
total amount of plaintiff's damages. Additionally, with comparative
contribution in force, the negotiators must estimate the degree of
fault that will be assigned to each tortfeasor as well as the plaintiff.
Under the new comparative scheme, the likelihood of
"miscalculation" surely would increase, making the occurrence of
undervaluation and overvaluation more frequent. However, this consideration alone does not necessitate a change in the basic approach.
The experience of other jurisdictions indicates that the complexities
involved in settlements pursuant to a comparative system have not
made the process unworkable.68 Most significantly, Louisiana's
scheme is particularly compatible with comparative contribution: it
accords finality to settlement and places the risk of miscalculation
on the persons who participated in the settlement negotiations.
Both the new legislation and the prior caselaw have left
unresolved the proper treatment of settlements when one of the remaining tortfeasors is or becomes insolvent. For example, suppose
plaintiff (P) settles with A reserving his rights against B and C.
Subsequently, in P's action against B and C, it is discovered that C
is insolvent.
The Louisiana courts have yet to decide how the insolvency loss
should be distributed in such a case. There are at least three possible
solutions. The court could rule that (1) P may recover 2/3 of his
damages from B and B may not seek contribution from A due to the
67. Effecting a proportionate rather than per capita deduction is consistent with
the language of article 2203, see note 63, supra, that simply provides for a deduction of
the "part" of the released tortfeasor. After adoption of comparative contribution,
"part" may justifiably be construed to mean "proportionate share."
68. For a discussion of the impact of the proportionate rule on settlements in admiralty and maritime personal injury cases, see United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
421 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1975). See also Gomes v. Broadhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968)
(proportionate reduction of settling tortfeasor's share adopted for Virgin Islands).
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prior release; 9 (2) P may recover 2/3 of his damages from B, but, in a
subsequent contribution action B may require A to share half of the
"loss" from C's insolvency;"0 (3) P may recover only 1/2 his damages
from B since P voluntarily chose to settle with A and therefore
must also risk that one of the remaining tortfeasors will be insolvent."
69. Requiring the remaining solvent tortfeasor to shoulder the insolvency loss
seems consistent with the legal rationale supporting the pro rata approach. The decision to reduce the judgment by the share of the settling tortfeasor (rather than by the
dollar amount of the settlement) is based on the doctrine of legal subrogation. The
courts have held that the release given to the settling tortfeasor by the plaintiff has
the effect of depriving the unreleased tortfeasor of his right to claim contribution from
the released party. Since the plaintiff has voluntarily given up his right to proceed
against the released person, the remaining tortfeasor cannot acquire that right via
subrogation. Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915, 921 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964);
see Cunningham v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 228 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1969).
The release, however, has no legal effect on the solvent tortfeasor's right to seek
contribution from an insolvent joint tortfeasor who has not been released by the plaintiff. That the exercise of the contribution right in this instance will not lessen the solvent tortfeasor's burden is solely attributable to the fact of insolvency and cannot be
traced to any action on the plaintiff's part.
70. Conceivably, B could base his claim of the contribution right against A on
Civil Code article 2105 which provides:
In case the creditor has renounced his action in solido against one of the debtors,
and one or more of the other codebtors become insolvent, the portion of the
insolvent shall be made up, by equal contribution, by all the debtors, and even
those precedently discharged from the debt by the creditor in solido, shall contribute their part.
A superficial reading of the article might suggest that it was intended to establish
an independent contribution right against released tortfeasors in all cases of insolvency. Although the courts have yet to address the issue, it is most probable that the provision has very limited application. By its own terms, article 2105 governs only the
case in which the creditor has renounced his "action in solido against one of the debtors." (Emphasis added.) The article apparently is intended to cover only those rare instances in which the creditor consents to a division of the debt with regard to the settling tortfeasor (ie., renounces his action in solido as to that debtor only), but does not
simultaneously release the settlor from his obligation to pay his fair share of the debt.
See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2100-01.
The limited release contemplated by article 2105 differs significantly from the ordinary article 2203 release, see note 63, supra, by which the creditor unconditionally absolves the settlor from any further payment. If only a limited release is secured, the
settling tortfeasor's exposure is twofold: (1) he may be required to share in the insolvency loss under article 2105 and (2) he remains liable to the plaintiff in the event
that the consideration paid under the settlement turns out to be less than his virile
share.
71. The only arguable statutory basis for requiring plaintiff to share the insolvency loss is Civil Code article 2203, see note 63, supra. B might contend that C's insolvency should be held to increase the virile share or "part" of each solvent tortfeasor from
1/3 to 1/2, since there is no longer any real opportunity for a three-way division of
the debt. B's argument would be most persuasive if it could be demonstrated that the
plaintiff knew of C's insolvency at the time of the settlement. In such cases, it is
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Under a contributory negligence scheme, the most appropriate
solution would be to place the entire insolvency loss on the nonsettling solvent tortfeasor, at least when it was not apparent at the time
of settlement that a remaining tortfeasor was insolvent. Thus P
should be able to secure 2/3 of the damages from B and B should not
be able to mitigate his loss by seeking contribution from the
released party. As between P and B, it is fair to require the party
who is at fault to bear the loss; the totally innocent plaintiff should
not be required to shoulder 1/2 of the insolvency burden solely
because he chose to settle rather than litigate all claims. Moreover,
although A is also a tortfeasor, he should be permitted to benefit
from his settlement with the plaintiff, even at the expense of B.
Presumably, B had the option to settle with the plaintiff rather than
take his chances at trial.
The equities differ, however, under a comparative regime when
the plaintiff is also negligent. Granted the settlement should be
treated as final and the settling tortfeasor should escape paying for
the insolvency loss. But it would be unfair to charge the nonsettling
solvent tortfeasor with the entire insolvency loss by reducing plaintiff's judgment only by the proportionate share of the settling tortfeasor. Instead, it would be preferable to distribute the shortfall
resulting from C's insolvency between P and B in proportion to
their degrees of fault."2 Thus P's judgment would be reduced by
both the proportionate share of the settling tortfeasor and that part
of C's share that P should proportionately bear.
The proportionate sharing approach is not totally foreclosed by
either the new legislation or the jurisprudence. As discussed earlier,
however, amended article 2324 may be read to impose the entire insolvency loss on either the plaintiff or the nonsettling solvent tortfeasor, depending on who was more at fault.73 A clear legislative
statement on the problem would be helpful.
Set-off or Compensation
The proper treatment of reconventional demands or
counterclaims under a pure comparative negligence system is an
issue that arises both in the simple two party case and in multiple
party litigation.74 With the adoption of pure comparative negligence
perhaps reasonable to view plaintiff's release of A as effectively releasing 1/2 of the
debt.
72. For an explanation of the mechanics of proportionate reduction in cases involving both insolvency and prior release, see UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, comment.
73. See text at notes 59-61, supra.
74. For discussion of the options regarding the set-off problem, see Fleming, supra
note 9, at 1470-71; Pearson, supra note 61, at 358-59; Wade, supra note 61, at 311-12.
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there is an increased likelihood that both (or all) parties may be entitled to recover for damages sustained in an accident. For example,
in a three car collision resulting in injury to the three drivers due to
the combined negligence of each, it would be impossible or at least
highly unlikely that all three would recover damages under a contributory negligence or a modified comparative negligence regime."5
If pure comparative negligence is in force, however, each driver may
be allowed to recover on his claim; it is at this point that the problem of whether the resulting liabilities should be set off frequently
will arise.
The set-off determination involves more than procedural niceties
or efficient administration-when any party carries liability insurance, the determination may dramatically affect the parties'
ultimate recovery. Assume that A and B each suffers $100,000 of
damage, that both acted negligently, and that their respective
degrees of fault are assessed at 30% and 70%. Under the new Act,
A now owes B $30,000 and B correspondingly owes $70,000 to A. If
both parties are uninsured, it would be simple and equitable to
render one judgment in favor of A for $40,000, thus offsetting their
respective liabilities.
However, if the parties are fully insured, requiring or permitting B's insurer to simply pay A $40,000 would be grossly unfair to
both injured parties. Neither A nor B has received full compensation
for his injury-in fact both are short by $30,000. Most importantly,
each party obtained insurance so that the carrier, not the insured,
would ultimately bear the costs attributable to the insured's
negligence. Permitting set-off under these circumstances would
allow the insurers to save $60,000 at the expense of the tort victims.
In essence, each insurer could escape paying for $30,000 worth of injuries caused by its insured's negligence simply by relying on its
6
insured's offsetting claim against the tortfeasor1
Despite its substantive importance, the question of set-off is not
dealt with in the comparative negligence Act." In the absence of
such special legislation, reference must be made to the Civil Code
75. In a modified comparative negligence jurisdiction, all three drivers would be
entitled to some recovery if they were equally at fault and if the law provides that the
plaintiff's fault should be compared to the combined fault of the defendants. See Pearson, supra note 61, at 358 n.62.
76. For an example of the drastic effect of set-off in a three-party case, see Robertson, Comparative Negligence, 24 LA. B.J. 180, 183-84 (1976).
77. Only a few comparative negligence acts contain special provisions on set-off.
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 18.490 (1975) (barring set-off); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4.1 (1971)
(barring set-off); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2 2 12 a § 2(f) (Vernon 1973) (mandatory
set-off).
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articles dealing generally with compensation to determine to what
extent offsetting claims may be used to reduce the insurer's obligation under the new scheme."
Compensation functions as one method of extinguishing an
obligation."9 Where applicable, the Civil Code provides for compensation by the mere operation of law, even absent the parties' prior
agreement. ° The most significant prerequisite for legal compensation to take place is that the offsetting debts be "equally liquidated
and demandable.""1
In the typical tort action, however, the debt owed by the tortfeasor will not be considered liquidated until it is reduced to judgment;" it is only after judgment hasl been rendered that legal compensation becomes an issue.8" Thus, in the prior example, there is
nothing to prevent the court from rendering two separate
judgments, one in favor of A for $70,000 and another in favor of B
for $30,000.4 At that point, however, legal compensation definitely
78. Since there is considerable risk that the general Code articles on compensation could be misapplied in the comparative setting (for example, see the confusion in
Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 231 La. 859, 863 n.1, 93 So.2d 194, 195 n.1 (1957)),
the legislature should consider adoption of a specific set-off provision similar to that of
section 3 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. See Wade, supra note 61, at 311-12.
The discussion in the text deals solely with present law in the event that no specific
set-off provision is enacted.
79. See generally LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2207-16; 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
pt. 1, nos. 586-87, at 322 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
80. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2208 states: "Compensation takes place of course by the
mere operation of law, even unknown to the debtors; the two debts are reciprocally
extinguished, as soon as they exist simultaneously, to the amount of their respective
sums."
81. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2209. This article provides: "Compensation takes place only
between two debts, having equally for their object a sum of money, or a certain quantity of consumable things of one and the same kind, and which are equally liquidated
and demandable. The days of grace are no obstacle to the compensation."
82. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 231 La. 859, 863 n.1, 93 So. 2d 194, 195 n.1
(1957) ("compensation or offset, which takes place by operation of law, applies only as
to liquidated debts and has no pertinency to tort claims"); cf. Hartley v. Hartley, 349
So. 2d 1258, 1261 (La. 1977) (husband's unliquidated claim for reimbursement of community funds could not offset past due alimony debt).
83. Cf, e.g., Firmin v. Miller, 355 So. 2d 977, 918 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) ("[any
final judgment can be used in setoff or compensation by the judgment creditor against
a claim by the judgment debtor").
84. If B chooses to plead compensation in a reconventional demand, however, the
court may judicially offset the parties' obligations and render only one judgment in
favor of A for $40,000. This form of compensation or set-off (termed "judicial compensation") serves merely to avoid two payments and may take place despite the fact that
when B filed his reconventional demand, his claim against A was unliquidated. Tolbird
v. Cooper, 243 La. 306, 143 So. 2d 80 (1962); Blanchard v. Cole, 8 La. 153 (1835). Of
course, before the court can declare the offset, it must determine the respective legal
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comes into play such that B may discharge his obligation by paying
A $40,000 from his own pocket.85
Despite the termination of the tort litigation, the question of the
contractual obligations of the insurers of A and B is unresolved.
Looking to the nature of the insurance contract itself," B should
now be able to recover $70,000 from his own insurer based on the
judgment of the court that B was liable to A for that amount. That
B has chosen to pay part of that liability by setting off the $30,000
debt owed to him by A is irrelevant insofar as the relationship between B and his insurer is concerned. This can be readily
understood by examining the situation in which A's debt to B arises
from a totally unrelated obligation, e.g., A owes B $30,000 for services rendered pursuant to a prior building contract between the
parties. Certainly under such circumstances B's insurer would not
be heard to insist that it need only pay $40,000 to B based on its
liability insurance contract. A different result is not required solely
because A's obligation to B arises from the same event that also
produces B's obligation.
Similarly, even after A receives $40,000 from B, A should nevertheless have the right to obtain $30,000 from his own insurer,
representing the amount of A's liability to B pursuant to the judgment of the court in the tort litigation. Although the set-off has effectively ended A's duty to pay $30,000 to B, A's insurer should not
be relieved of its contractual obligation to pay for the liability
resulting from A's negligent conduct.
Thus if the Civil Code articles on compensation are properly applied, the loss from the accident ultimately will be borne by both insurers in proportion to the negligence of their respective insureds.liabilities of each party. In essence, the single judgment represents the court's determination that B was liable to A for $70,000 and chose to discharge part of that obligation by foregoing his right to collect $30,000 from A. Cf. Standard Roofing Co. v.
Ragusa Bros., 338 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (dismissal of plaintiff's smaller
claim improper in judicial offset case).
85. Assuming that B chooses not to provoke judicial compensation by asking for
such relief in a reconventional demand, see note 84, supra, he may still rely on legal
compensation to limit execution of A's $70,000 judgment to $40,000. See Pattison v.
Edmonston, 4 La. Ann. 157 (1849); Firmin v. Miller, 355 So. 2d 977 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977); Sliman v. Mahtook, 17 La. App. 635, 136 So. 749 (1st Cir. 1931). Thus once B
pays $40,000 to A, A no longer has the option to recover the $30,000 balance from B
and must look to his own insurer to recoup his loss.
86. One of the primary purposes of the liability insurance contract is to provide
protection to the insured "for any legal liability said insured may have as or for a tortfeasor." LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962). Once judgment has been rendered, there can be
no doubt that such legal liability exists, and the insurer becomes bound to indemnify
its insured for any payment (whether effected by compensation or otherwise) made for
the purpose of discharging the legal obligation.
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B's insurer paying $70,000 and A's insurer paying $30,000. As long as
the set-off feature is not held to diminish the obligations of the insurers to their own insureds, an equitable result can be reached under
the existing codal scheme.
The Civil Code also provides guidance in the more common case
in which the insurer is either joined as a party defendant or is sued
as the sole defendant under Louisiana's direct action statute."'
Under the direct action statute, the insurer is liable "jointly and in
solido" with its insured for injuries sustained by the plaintiff. In
turn, the Civil Code expressly states that a debtor in solido may not
raise as a basis for diminution of his liability the indebtedness of the
plaintiff to his co-obligor, i.e., the "defense" of compensation is considered a personal defenseY
Assume that A in the hypothetical case chooses to sue B's insurer alone. In that action, the insurer should not be allowed to
argue that A's "offsetting" $30,000 liability to its insured B should
reduce its debt from $70,000 to $40,000. Moreover, if B is joined in
the action and presses his claim against A and A's insurer, the Civil
Code prohibits A's insurer from claiming that it has no duty to pay
$30,000 solely because B owes its insured the greater sum of
$70,000. In short, the Civil Code does not permit the insurer to plead
compensation when. sued as a solidary co-obligor. The result of
course is functionally the same as in the litigation between the insureds alone-i.e., B's insurer will pay $70,000 to A while A's insurer will pay B $30,000.98
87.
88.

LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962).
LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962) provides in part:
The injured person or his or her survivors or heirs hereinabove referred to, at
their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the
terms and limits of the policy; and such action may be brought against the insurer
alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido ....
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2211 provides in part: "Neither can the debtor in solido oppose the compensation of what the creditor owes to his codebtor." The word "oppose"
is used in the sense of "assert" or "set up." See 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA 1208-09 (La. St. L. Inst. 1942).
90. A problem might arise if only one of the parties is fully insured and the other
is either uninsured or has insufficient coverage. Assume, for example, that in the
hypothetical case A is uninsured and judgment proof. In A's suit against B's insurer,
the insurer would presumably have an obligation to pay $70,000 to A, i.e., B's debt to
A disregarding set-off. In order to secure payment of B's $30,000 debt to A, however,
B would have to attach or garnish his own insurer's payment to A. It is not unlikely
that this complicated process would invite confusion such that B would be unjustly required to pay for A's failure to adequately insure himself against loss. A more efficient
solution would be to require B's insurer to pay $40,000 to A and $30,000 directly to B.
In this respect, the present codal scheme might be regarded as inadequate. Neither
Louisiana's compulsory insurance law, LA. R.S. 32:861-64 (Supp. 1977), nor the
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The determination that the insurer should not benefit from compensation or set-off is fortified by the express policy of Louisiana's
direct action statute.9 That provision has recently been viewed as
serving a dual purpose: to assure financial protection of victims of
automobile accidents and to protect the insured against exposure. "
Only by denying the insurer the opportunity to benefit from the offsetting claim of its insured will both the injured party and the insured be given the maximum protection.
Conclusion
This selective sampling of the problems posed by Act 431 in
multiple party litigation suggests only that successful implementation of comparative fault in Louisiana will not be easy. A reform of
this magnitude necessarily entails a host of adjustments. Several
subsidiary issues such as the treatment of insolvency losses call for
more detailed legislation to conform to the proportionate scheme.
For these relatively minor matters, the experience of other jurisdictions can be most helpful in devising clear, equitable statutory rules.
But the introduction of comparative fault in Louisiana also
places weighty demands upon the courts. Particularly in the multiple party suit, it is extremely difficult to apportion losses with due
regard for the legal duties of the parties as delimited by the court,
yet give real effect to the legislative principle of liability based on
proportionate fault. Such an accommodation will not likely yield
uniform results but nevertheless has the potential to promote the
ultimate goal of equitable loss apportionment.
availability of uninsured motorist coverage guarantees that the fully insured victim
will be completely protected when injured by an uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor.
Section 3 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides an equitable solution in such
cases. See Wade, supra note 61, at 311-12.
91. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962). The statute provides that
lilt is also the intent of this Section that all liability policies within their terms
and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons, his or her survivors
or heirs, to whom the insured is liable; and that it is the purpose of all liability
policies to give protection and coverage to all insureds, whether they are named
insureds or additional insureds under the omnibus clause, for any legal liability
said insured may have as or for a tort-feasor within the terms and limits of said
policy.
92. Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So. 2d 1279 (La. 1978) (on rehearing).

